Case Laws That Self Represented Litigant Can Use In Their Court Case

Case Laws That Self Represented Litigant Can Use In Their Court Case

Sharswood to Blackstone, through which original sources we derive our best definition of civil or municipal law as being "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power of a state."”

-Sevier v. Riley, 198 Cal. 170, 175 (Cal. 1926)​ The civil laws effective in an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction are Federal law, notwithstanding their derivation from State laws, and a cause arising under such laws may be brought in or removed to a Federal district court under sections 24 or 28 of the former Judicial Code (now sections 1331 and 1441 of title 28, United States Code), giving jurisdiction to such courts of civil actions arising under the color of law. No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it." ​ -16 AM Jurisprudence 2 d Constitutional Law 256 “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” ​

-Norton vs Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, p. 442 "An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. ​

An offence created by it is not a crime." ​ Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1880), ​ -Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 408 (1963) ​ "it never became a law and was as much a nullity as if it had been the act or declaration of an unauthorized assemblage of individuals." ​

-Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160​ An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government. ​

-Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F. Supp. 94​ ​ Officers of the court have no immunity, when violating a constitutional right, for they are deemed to know the law.” ​ -Owens v Independence 100 S.C.T. 1398 ​ “Judge loses his absolute immunity from damage actions only when he acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction or performance of an act which is not judicial in nature.” -Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202 When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially and thus are not protected by “qualified” or “limited immunity,” ​ Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; ​ Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404 ​ “the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer, and not in a judicial capacity”

-Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, (Va. 1930) “No officer can acquire jurisdiction by deciding that he has it. In all such cases, every officer, whether judicial or ministerial, decides at his peril.” ​

-Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596, 607 (Cal. 1866)​ Administrative is defined as follows: “Commonly the word has been defined as ministerial; pertaining to administration, particularly, having the character of executive or ministerial action; and, when particularly applied to official duties connected with government, executive, a ministerial duty; one in which nothing is 'left to discretion.” ​ 2 C.J.S. p. 56.​

-Mauritz v. Schwind, 101 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. App. 1937) “Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.”

-Trinsey v. Pagliaro, 229 F. Supp. 647, 649 (E.D. Pa. 1964) Statement of Counsel can never be entered into the Evidence file, as it is nothing but hearsay, and not up to the level of Fact. Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment." 229 F. Supp. at 649. This is an uncontroversial statement that argument by counsel is not the same as evidence.”

-Sundsmo v. Calkins, 15-cv-2-jdp, 3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016) Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment." Id. Here, although Defendants made arguments in the answer and briefs, the Magistrate Judge did not rely on those unsupported statements and arguments of counsel in making recommendation... -Penn v. Ogg, Case No.: 1:14-cv-76, 2014 Ohio 5481 (2014) 79 "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time," and "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." ​

-Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. 395 F 2d 906, 910 "Defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even on appeal." Hill Top -Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp. 478 So. 2D, 368 Fla a DCA 1985) "Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist." ​ -Stuck v. Medical Examiners 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 289 ​ "There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction." -Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215 "Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff." ​ -Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 I11.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841(1988) "the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it." ​

-Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017(1st Dist. 1991) "Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted."

​ -Lantana v. Hopper,102 F. 2d 188; ​ Chicago v. New York 37 FSupp. 150​ Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been the law from the days of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke 68; also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,351." ​

-Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948.​ “A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect” ​

-Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972). ​ Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980). ​ “Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed.” ​

-City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 ​ (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973).​ An act wrongfully done by an officer, under the pretended authority of his office, and grounded upon corruption, to which the office is a mere shadow of color. ​ 41 N. Y. 464.​ "Color of office" is defined by the law dictionaries, as “champerty, an act wrongfully done by an officer, under the pretended authority of his office, and grounded upon corruption, to which the office is a mere shadow of color.”​

-Griffiths v. Hardenbergh, 41 N.Y. 464 The words color of office necessarily imply an illegal claim of right or authority to take the security, or to do the act in question, by virtue of his office, which claim is a mere color or pretence on the part of the officer.​ ​ "color of office" is when an act is evilly done, by the countenance of an officer; and is always taken, in the worst sense, being grounded upon corruption, to which the office is as a mere shadow or color.”​ -Burrall v. Acker, 23 Wend. 606 “"Colorable" is a word legally defined as "That which has or gives color; that which is in appearance only, and not in reality, what it purports to be, hence counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth."” ​

-Windle, Adm'x v. Flinn, 251 P.2d 136, 196 Or. 654 (1952)​ “In Texas no act or omission is a crime unless made so by statute.”

-Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (S.D. Tex. 1971)​ "But individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its obligations. In their official capacity, therefore, they have no privilege against self-incrimination. And the official records and documents of the organization that are held by them in a representative rather than in a personal capacity cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against self-incrimination, even though production of the papers might tend to incriminate them personally."

-Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1988) ...the judgment of conviction was contrary to the weight of evidence adduced at the trial, in other words, that the facts elicited by the prosecution were not sufficient to prove said defendant-appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is believed that all of the authorities hold that a violation of the instant section under consideration, even though it is deemed to be an "infraction", rather than a crime, must be proved in all of its essential elements, beyond a reasonable doubt. -People v. Marsellus, 4 Misc. 2d 211, 213 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1956)​ ​ “Service of an appearance ticket on an accused does not confer personal or subject matter jurisdiction upon a Criminal Court.” -People v. Giusti, 176 Misc. 2d 377, 381 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1998)​ ​ “It is well settled that an appearance ticket is not an accuse. “It is well settled that an appearance ticket is not an accusatory instrument and its filing does not confer jurisdiction over defendant” ​

-People v. Gabbay, 175 Misc. 2d 421, 421 (N.Y. App. Term 1997) “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ​

-Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ​It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function — thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.

-Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985) ​18 USC 241: Conspiracy against rights​. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; You are still presumed innocent, and the government carries the burden of proof.

Municipal Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.” “"In the exercise of any power or authority — "​ (a) No sanction shall be imposed or substantive rule or order be issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law." -June 11, 1946, c. 324, § 9, 60 Stat. 242.”

-Olesen v. Stanard, 227 F.2d 785, 788 n.7 (9th Cir. 1955)​ When it appears, as it does here, that a court does not have jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court to immediately dismiss the action.” ​

-Stanard v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ​​ No officer can acquire jurisdiction by deciding that he has it. In all such cases, every officer, whether judicial or ministerial, decides at his peril.”​ -Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596, 607 (Cal. 1866) Where there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter, there is, as well, no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction. See F.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), supra note 1 -Joyce v. United States, 474 F.2d 215, 218 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973) “Although lack of probable cause may not be inferred from malice, malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause.” ​ -Pauley v. Hall, 124 Mich. App. 255, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) “The Court of Appeals, Krucker, J., held that State Bar Act of 1933 creating State Bar Association as public corporation has no viability and designation of State Bar as public corporation has no legal efficacy” ​ -Bridegroom v. State Bar, 550 P.2d 1089, 27 Ariz. App. 47 (1976) there is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere, but powerless outside of it. In this country sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld. -Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884) A delegate cannot delegate; an agent cannot delegate his ​ 124Constitution Academy functions to a subagent without the knowledge or consent of the principal; the person to whom an office or duty is delegated cannot lawfully devolve the duty on another, unless he be expressly authorized so to do.” ​ 9 Coke, 77; ​ Broom, Max. 840; ​ 2 Kent, Comm. 633; ​ 2 Steph. Comm. 119 “A delegated power cannot be again delegated.” ​ -2 Inst. 597; Black's, 2d. 347; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1300 ​​​​​“Unsupported contentions of material fact are not sufficient. Material facts must be supported by affidavits and other testimony and documents that would be admissible in evidence at trial”​ -Cinco Enterprises, Inc. v. Benso, 890 P.2d 866, 871 (Okla. 1994) “Mere contention that facts exist or might exist is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment.”​ -Loper v. Austin, 596 P.2d 544, 546 (Okla. 1979) This Court has previously held that the mere contention that facts exist or might exist is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. The party responding to a motion for summary judgment has an obligation to present something which shows that when the date of trial arrives, he will have some proof to support ​ 126Constitution Academy his allegations​ -Davis v. Leitner, 782 P.2d 924, 926 (Okla. 1989) ​ Serving the summons warrant upon the defendant must be served by a processor with a Notice in New Jersey. ​A court of justice, or judicial tribunal;​ a place of jurisdiction;​ a place where a remedy is sought; a place of litigation.​ 3 Story, 347. An attorney cannot make accusations and statements against you when they are not representing anybody. They have to be representing an actual injured party in order for them to make a statement or a brief or an argument against you. If there is no injured party. The Plaintiff asked the judge Clement what was cause of action in writing about a court appearance did not exist. the judge, “if this complaint is a civil action or criminal action?” If they say a criminal action then demand to see the sworn statement from an injured party or subpoena this supposed witness/or injured party to the crime...because you have the right to face your accuser and it cannot be a cop or attorney. The legal principle is called corpus delicti, the body of the crime, “Who?” is the biggest question! Who accused me? Who was injured? Who made the statement against me? Who? Who? Who? A cop can’t be a “who”. A prosecutor can’t be a “who”. An attorney cannot be a “who”. Please remember this. “Is this a criminal action?” “Who’s the plaintiff?” “Where’s the complaint?” ​ NOTICE IT DOESN’T SAY “MADE BY” AN OFFICER. ​ SOMEONE OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT ​ HAS TO MAKE THE COMPLAINT!​ A citation is not “EVIDENCE” a “crime” has been committed.​ A citation is just a summons to appear in court or answer. ​An information is a written accusation made by a public prosecutor, without the intervention of a grand jury.​ -Salvail v. Sharkey, 271 A.2d 814, 108 R.I. 63 (1970) the corpus delicti must he proved independently of extra-judicial confessions, and beyond reasonable doubt; and without such proof of the corpus delicti, evidence of the confession is inadmissible at the trial. The corpus delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence other than such extrajudicial confessions. If there be no evidence that a crime has been committed, it is improper to admit upon the trial, evidence of the confession of the accused.​ -Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472, 2 Morr. St. Cas. 1655 (1871) ​ It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime cannot be had unless the corpus delicti—that is, the fact that a crime has actually been perpetrated (the fact of injury or harm and the existence of some person criminally responsible therefor)—is first established by the prosecution.’​ ​ In other words, the prosecution must establish the actual commission, by some-one, of the particular offense charged.​ ​ The accused is not required in any case to answer a charge against him in the absence of evidence upon the part of the prosecution sufficient to establish the corpus delicti...​ and if an accused is found guilty despite the failure of the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti, the verdict may be set aside and a new trial ordered.* -American Jurisprudence 2D, Volume 29 Evidence​ Section 149, page 182: Corpus Delicti -American Jurisprudence 2D, Volume 29 Evidence Section 149, page 182: Corpus Delicti -McCormick on Evidence 3rd edition by Edward W. Cleary (1984) Section 145, pages 365-367 New Jersey “The term “corpus delecti” embraces occurrence of loss or injury and criminal causation thereof.” ​ -State v. Hill, 221 A.2d. 725, 728, 47 N.J. 490. "Proof of the corpus delecti ‐ the fact of injury or, in a homicide case, of death, by a criminal agency ‐ may be supplied by direct or circumstantial evidence.​ -State v. Zarinsky, 362 A.2d. 611, 621. ​ ​ "Proof of the corpus delecti is required in all criminal cases...There are three basic elements in the proof of a crime: (1) the occurrence of loss or injury, (2) criminal causation of that loss or injury and (3) the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. However, it is firmly established in this State that the term corpus delecti embraces only the first two of these elements‐loss or injury and criminal causation." ​ -State v. Hill, 221 A.2d. 725, 728. ​ ​ "It is true that the above care all cases of felonious homicide, but the doctrine [of corpus delecti] is in nowise peculiar to such cases; it is equally applicable to all criminal cases." ​ -State v. Gelzeiler, 128 A. 240. ​ ​ ​ 239Understanding The Courts “Standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.”​ -Watkins v. Resorts Intern. Hotel & Casino, 591 A.2d. 592, 601 (N.J. 1991). ​ ​ “Normally, an individual will only be permitted to seek judicial vindication of his own rights.” -State v. Norflett, 337 A.2d. 609. ​ ​ “Standing requires only a substantial likelihood of some harm visited upon the plaintiff in the event of an unfavorable decision." -In re Camden County, 790 A.2d. 158. ​ it will be helpful to define the term corpus delicti. There are three basic elements in the proof of any crime. First, the occurrence of loss or injury (a death in murder, a burnt dwelling house in common law arson, etc.); ​ secondly, criminal causation of the loss or injury as opposed to accident (i. e.j some one committed a crime),-and lastly, the defendant’s identity or connection with the crime (i. e., that the defendant in fact was the perpetrator of the crime)​ Dean Wigmore has suggested that in its correct meaning the term corpus delicti has reference only to the first of these elements, namely, the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained.​ -State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 30 N.J. 37 (1959) The municipal court is not a court of remedy the case of action taken the court is unconstiutional, which is not in confromity with the course of the common law or constitution where a court of genderal jurisdiction has a special authority upon it by statue, it quoad hoc, an inferrior or limited court. -Gunn V. Howell, 27 Ala. 663 (18550 Harlow vs. Fitzgerald (19820) 28 USC Paragrph 1746. Hazel Atlas vs. Hartford (1944) Judicial complaint if the judge ignores the perjury. -Caperton v. Massey (2009) Jurisdiction must be established on record -Steel Co. V. Citizens for a Better Evt. 523 U.S. 83 (1998) Defendants must be tried on valid charger support by evidence. Cole vs. Arkansas 33 U.S. 196 (1948) Mathew v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) Goldberg vs. Kelly, 397 U.S. 234 (1970) You cannot punish people for exercising a constitutional protect right. -Shuttlesworth vs. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first forting in the way. -Body vs. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) Ex parte McCardie, 74 U.S. 506 (1969) Court created by statute have only powers expressly granted by law; they can not exceed their statutory authority. -Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) Hodge v. Jones Holding Co. USA LLC v Jefferson county 380 S.W. 3d 52, 63-65 (Tenn 212) USA, LLC v. Jefferson City Douglas v.s Straw (2024) Scheuer vs Rhode (1974) Milliken vs. Bradeley (1977) Verizon Maryland, Inc. vs. Public Service Commission of Maryland (2002)

 

Most of these citations are to real cases or sources, but many are misrepresented, quoted out of context, from the wrong jurisdiction, outdated, or not applicable to a typical modern case (especially a municipal traffic or quasi-criminal matter in New Jersey like the Glen Ridge Municipal Court example you reference). A few appear to be fabricated or mis-cited entirely. You can technically “cite” them in a filing, but courts routinely reject these arguments as frivolous, circular, or inapplicable—and doing so can backfire with sanctions, wasted time, or a faster loss. This list is a common compilation that circulates in certain online “constitutional” or sovereign-citizen-adjacent materials (you can see the “Constitution Academy” and “Understanding The Courts” section headers in your paste). Below I break it down factually.

Legitimate Cases with Accurate (or Mostly Accurate) Quotes in Narrow Context

These exist and say roughly what is claimed, but the holdings are limited and almost never help dismiss jurisdiction or invalidate a traffic/municipal citation:

• Sevier v. Riley, 198 Cal. 170 (1926): Real. The Blackstone-derived definition of “civil or municipal law” appears verbatim. Purely definitional; irrelevant to jurisdiction challenges.
• Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886): Real and famous. The quote (“An unconstitutional act is not law…”) is accurate. Classic language, but a court must first declare the statute unconstitutional before this applies. It does not let you ignore statutes or citations preemptively.
• Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880): Real. “An unconstitutional law is void… An offence created by it is not a crime” is exact. Again, applies only after a court rules the law unconstitutional; habeas context for federal convictions.
• Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 (1930): Real. The quote about the judge acting as an “administrative officer” (not judicial) when reinstating a revoked driver’s permit under a specific city ordinance is accurate—but it is limited to that narrow administrative function in 1930 Virginia. It does not mean every municipal traffic judge is “administrative” or lacks jurisdiction.
• Trinsey v. Pagliaro, 229 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Pa. 1964): Real. The exact language about statements/arguments of counsel not being evidence for summary judgment or dismissal is correct. Useful in civil procedure, but irrelevant to criminal/traffic jurisdiction or proving “no injured party.”
• People v. Giusti, 176 Misc. 2d 377 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1998) and People v. Gabbay, 175 Misc. 2d 421 (N.Y. App. Term 1997): Real New York cases. Appearance tickets do not confer jurisdiction in NY criminal courts under their specific rules. New Jersey uses different procedures—NJ traffic summonses/complaints do confer jurisdiction under NJ Court Rules (e.g., Rule 3:2, 7:2). These NY cases have zero binding effect in NJ.
• Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980): Real (note: your list says “Owens” and “445 U.S. 662”—minor typos). The case is about municipal § 1983 liability (cities have no qualified immunity). It does NOT say judges “do not act judicially” when enforcing statutes or lose all immunity. That extension is a common misrepresentation.
• Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 395 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1968), Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Cal. App. 2d 751 (1949), and several others on jurisdiction challenges (e.g., “jurisdiction can be challenged at any time,” burden on the party asserting it): These are real and stand for standard black-letter procedural law. Courts already know this; it does not magically defeat statutory traffic jurisdiction.

Misrepresented, Out-of-Context, or Non-Binding

• The long federal-jurisdiction paragraph (“civil laws effective in an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction…”) is NOT from a court case. It comes from a 1957 federal government report (“Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States”). It discusses enclave law and removal under old Judicial Code sections. It has nothing to do with state municipal courts or traffic tickets.
• 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 256 (“No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law…”): This treatise language exists in older editions and is generally true once unconstitutionality is declared, but again, it is not self-executing.
• Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160; Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F. Supp. 94; Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596: Real older cases, but quotes are stretched far beyond their facts (19th-century or specific contexts).
• “Officers of the court have no immunity…” (attributed to Owen): Misattributed/inferred. Judges have absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts (Stump v. Sparkman, Pierson v. Ray, etc.). The “know the law” line is a loose paraphrase of Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) qualified-immunity doctrine for executive officials—not judges.
• Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202 (“Judge loses his absolute immunity only when…”): This case does not appear in official reporters or reliable databases with that holding. The language shows up only in the same online lists as yours. Likely fabricated or conflated with other immunity cases.
• Bothke v. Terry, 713 F.2d 1404 (“When enforcing mere statutes, judges… do not act judicially”): The case exists (9th Cir. tax case), but the quoted language does not appear in it. Pure fabrication common in these compilations.
• Corpus delicti / “no injured party” / “citation is not evidence” sections (Pitts v. State, People v. Marsellus, State v. Hill, State v. Zarinsky, American Jurisprudence 2d Evidence § 149, etc.): Real doctrines, but they apply to proving the fact of a crime (especially with confessions) in true criminal cases. Traffic/regulatory offenses in NJ are often strict-liability or public-welfare violations (mala prohibita). No “injured party” or classic corpus delicti is required for a valid complaint/summons. A police-issued citation is a valid charging document under NJ law. “Who is the plaintiff?” and “cop can’t be the who” arguments are routinely rejected.
• “Color of office,” “colorable,” administrative vs. judicial, delegated powers cannot be delegated, etc.: Older definitions or maxims. Courts distinguish judicial vs. administrative acts, but municipal judges hearing traffic cases act judicially and have jurisdiction under statute. Immunity applies.
• 18 U.S.C. § 241, Brady v. United States (waivers), Bulloch v. United States (fraud on court), Caperton v. Massey (bias), etc.: Real, but irrelevant unless you have specific evidence of conspiracy, unknowing waiver, or actual judicial bias. Not a blanket defense to jurisdiction.
• Later scattered cites (Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, Cole v. Arkansas, Mathews v. Eldridge, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, Ex parte Siebold again, etc.): All real, but standard due-process or jurisdiction principles that courts already apply. They do not invalidate statutory traffic enforcement.

Bottom Line – Can These Be Used in a Case?

• Technically yes — you can file a motion or brief citing them. Jurisdiction can always be challenged, and some principles (burden of proof on jurisdiction, void judgments, etc.) are correct in the abstract.
• Practically, almost never successfully in the context this list is meant for (municipal traffic/citation case in NJ or similar). NJ municipal courts have clear statutory jurisdiction over motor-vehicle offenses (N.J.S.A. 39:5-1 et seq., Court Rules 7:1–7:12). “No injured party,” “appearance ticket = no jurisdiction,” “judge is administrative,” “unconstitutional statute therefore void,” and similar arguments have been tried thousands of times and rejected. Judges view them as frivolous. Federal removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or habeas on these grounds also fails.
• Many of the strongest-sounding lines come from 19th-century or early-20th-century cases, different states, or non-binding treatises/reports, and have been limited by later precedent (e.g., judicial immunity doctrine is now very broad for core judicial functions).