New Jersey Manslaughter Lawyer
Voluntary manslaughter occurs when a person intentionally kills another person
after "adequate provocation"; that is, there has been action that was
sufficient to incite an "ordinary person" to "sudden and intense
passion" such that s/he loses self-control. It should be noted that the
time between provocation and the killing should not be long enough for the
passion to have cooled off.
In most states, "adequate
provocation" is defined to be only situations in which there is a threat
of deadly force, or in which a person finds his/her spouse in bed with another
person. Verbal threats are usually not considered adequate provocation.
Involuntary manslaughter generally occurs in only two cases. The first occurs when
someone is killed due to criminal negligence, and the second is when someone is
killed during the commission of another crime, where the intent was not to
cause bodily injury or death.
§ 2C:11-4
Criminal homicide constitutes
aggravated manslaughter when:
(1) The actor recklessly causes
death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life; or
(2) The actor causes the death of
another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer
in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:29-2. Notwithstanding the provision
of any other law to the contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a
violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of
N.J.S. 2C:29-2 which resulted in the death of another person. As used in this
paragraph, "actor" shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle.
Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter when:
(1) It is committed recklessly; or
(2) A homicide which would otherwise
be murder under section 2C:11-3 is committed in the heat of passion resulting
from a reasonable provocation.
Aggravated manslaughter is a crime of the first degree and upon conviction a person
may be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30
years. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.
It takes an attorney with the
confidence and experience of a former prosecutor to properly deal with
authorities when it comes to defending you against criminal charges. If you
have been accused or charged with such a crime, please do not hesitate to contact
Mr. Bellizia immediately. Criminal matters are not problems that will go away
when ignored. Early intervention in criminal matters, may achieve outstanding
results, and will be instrumental to the outcome of your case.
When you call us, you will get an immediate response. Mr. Bellizia and his staff are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, holidays and weekends included. Please do not hesitate to call us now to arrange a free consultation.
When you call us, you will get an immediate response. Mr. Bellizia and his staff are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, holidays and weekends included. Please do not hesitate to call us now to arrange a free consultation.
New
Jersey Permanent Statutes Database
2C:11-3c Restitution.
3.In
addition to the provisions of any other law requiring restitution, a person
convicted of murder pursuant to N.J.S.2C:11-3 shall be required to pay restitution
to the nearest surviving relative of the victim. The court shall determine the
amount and duration of the restitution pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-3 and the
provisions of chapter 46 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes.
L.2007,c.204,s.3.
2C:11-4 Manslaughter.
2C:11-4.
Manslaughter. a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
manslaughter when:
(1)The
actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life; or
(2)The
actor causes the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a
law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of
N.J.S.2C:29-2. Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the
contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph
upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 which resulted in
the death of another person. As used in this paragraph, "actor"
shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle.
3.In
addition to the provisions of any other law requiring restitution, a person
convicted of murder pursuant to N.J.S.2C:11-3 shall be required to pay restitution
to the nearest surviving relative of the victim. The court shall determine the
amount and duration of the restitution pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-3 and the
provisions of chapter 46 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes.L.2007,c.204,s.3.2C:11-4 Manslaughter.
2C:11-4.
Manslaughter. a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
manslaughter when:(1)The
actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life; or(2)The
actor causes the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a
law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of
N.J.S.2C:29-2. Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the
contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph
upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 which resulted in
the death of another person. As used in this paragraph, "actor"
shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle.
b.Criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(1)It
is committed recklessly; or
(2)A
homicide which would otherwise be murder under section 2C:11-3 is committed in
the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.
c.Aggravated
manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of
the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to
an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. Aggravated manslaughter
under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first
degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.
L.1978,
c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.21A; 1981, c.290, s.13; 1986, c.172, s.1; 1991,
c.341, s.1; 2001, c.412.
2C:11-5 Death by auto or vessel.
2C:11-5.
Death by auto or vessel.
a.Criminal
homicide constitutes vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle
or vessel recklessly.
Proof
that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been
without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to
an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the
defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was
operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of
section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that
the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was
operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in
violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an
inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that
may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.
b.Except
as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, vehicular homicide is a crime
of the second degree.
(1)If
the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any
intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with
a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in
R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his
driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any
violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the
Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85
(C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the
defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The
term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The
minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence
imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the
defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
(2)The
court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a
hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the
prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any
intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with
a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50
or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's
license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of
R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of
the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.),
or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings,
the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information
adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also
consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
(3)Vehicular
homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto
or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512
(C.39:4-50.4a) while:
(a)on
any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any
elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such
school property;
(b)driving
through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by
ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or
(c)driving
through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are
present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by
ordinance or resolution.
A
map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on
or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by
or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced
pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a
prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.
It
shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b)
of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct
took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while
driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a
prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles
were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense
or that the school was not in session.
(4)If
the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or
section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the defendant's license to operate
a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life,
which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon
that person.
c.For
good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this
section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.
d.Nothing
herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment
and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection
a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4.
As
used in this section, "auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance
propelled otherwise than by muscular power.
e.Any
person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall
forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the
defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of
sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would
constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the
need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its
findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or
information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and
shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant
information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition
to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this title.
amended
1981, c.312, s.1; 1983, c.39; 1984, c.212; 1985, c.97, s.1; 1988, c.75, s.1;
1989, c.211; 1991, c.237, s.1; 1995, c.285; 1999, c.185, s.1; 2003, c.143;
2012, c.22, s.1.
Criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter when:(1)It
is committed recklessly; or(2)A
homicide which would otherwise be murder under section 2C:11-3 is committed in
the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.c.Aggravated
manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of
the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to
an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. Aggravated manslaughter
under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first
degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.L.1978,
c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.21A; 1981, c.290, s.13; 1986, c.172, s.1; 1991,
c.341, s.1; 2001, c.412.2C:11-5 Death by auto or vessel.
2C:11-5.
Death by auto or vessel. a.Criminal
homicide constitutes vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle
or vessel recklessly.Proof
that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been
without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to
an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the
defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was
operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of
section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that
the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was
operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in
violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an
inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that
may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.b.Except
as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, vehicular homicide is a crime
of the second degree.(1)If
the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any
intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with
a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in
R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his
driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any
violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the
Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85
(C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the
defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The
term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The
minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence
imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the
defendant shall be ineligible for parole.(2)The
court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a
hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the
prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any
intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with
a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50
or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's
license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of
R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of
the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.),
or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings,
the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information
adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also
consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.(3)Vehicular
homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto
or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512
(C.39:4-50.4a) while:(a)on
any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any
elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such
school property;(b)driving
through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by
ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or(c)driving
through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are
present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by
ordinance or resolution.A
map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on
or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by
or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced
pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a
prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.It
shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b)
of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct
took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while
driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a
prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles
were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense
or that the school was not in session.(4)If
the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or
section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the defendant's license to operate
a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life,
which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon
that person.c.For
good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this
section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.d.Nothing
herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment
and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection
a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4. As
used in this section, "auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance
propelled otherwise than by muscular power.e.Any
person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall
forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the
defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of
sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would
constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the
need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its
findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or
information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and
shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant
information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition
to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this title.amended
1981, c.312, s.1; 1983, c.39; 1984, c.212; 1985, c.97, s.1; 1988, c.75, s.1;
1989, c.211; 1991, c.237, s.1; 1995, c.285; 1999, c.185, s.1; 2003, c.143;
2012, c.22, s.1.|
|
2C:11-1.Definitions
2C:11-1.
Definitions.
In
chapters 11 through 15, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
a.
"Bodily
injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical
condition;
b.
"Serious
bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
c.
"Deadly
weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or
substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is
intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim
reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury;
d.
"Significant
bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the
function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five
senses.
L.1978,
c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.19; 1981,c.384,s.1; 1995,c.307,s.1.
2C:11-2. Criminal homicide
a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section 2C:11-5, causes the death of another human being.
b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:11-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 20, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:11-2.1. Elapse of time between assault and death, prosecution for criminal homicide
The length of time which has elapsed between the initial assault and the death of the victim shall not be a bar to prosecution of the actor for criminal homicide.
Definitions2C:11-1.
Definitions.In
chapters 11 through 15, unless a different meaning plainly is required:a.
"Bodily
injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical
condition;b.
"Serious
bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;c.
"Deadly
weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or
substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is
intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim
reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury;d.
"Significant
bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the
function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five
senses.L.1978,
c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.19; 1981,c.384,s.1; 1995,c.307,s.1.2C:11-2. Criminal homicide
a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section 2C:11-5, causes the death of another human being.
b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:11-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 20, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:11-2.1. Elapse of time between assault and death, prosecution for criminal homicide
The length of time which has elapsed between the initial assault and the death of the victim shall not be a bar to prosecution of the actor for criminal homicide.
§ 2C:11-5. Death by auto or vessel
Our NJ defense
attorneys have handled hundreds of violent crimes cases in New Jersey,
including murder trials. As skilled trial lawyers, and former prosecutors, we
know how to effectively pursue positive results for our clients.
Our attorneys are
experienced in handling all types of violent crime cases at trial level,
including:
- Aggravated Manslaughter by Eluding
- Assault and Aggravated Assault
- Assault with a Deadly Weapon and Gun Crimes
- Domestic Violence
- Domestic Violence Restraining Orders
- Eluding a Police Officer
- Felony Murder
- Manslaughter
- Murder
- Murder and Homicide
- Resisting Arrest
- Robbery and Armed Robbery
- Sex Crimes
- Vehicular Manslaughter / Death by Auto
We also
handle cases involving bar fights, gang-related violent crimes, vehicular
assault and DUI accident charges.
a. Criminal homicide constitutes vehicular homicide when it is caused by
driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.Proof that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S. 39:4-50 or was operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L. 1952, c. 157 shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.
b. Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, vehicular homicide is a crime of the second degree.
(1) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S. 39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver’s license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S. 39:4-50, section 2 of P.L. 1981, c. 512, by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L. 1982, c. 85, or by the court for a violation of R.S. 39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
(2) The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the grounds therefore have been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S. 39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver’s license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S. 39:4-50, section 2 of P.L. 1981, c. 512, by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L. 1982, c. 85, or by the court for a violation of R.S. 39:4-96. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
(3) Vehicular homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S. 39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L. 1981, c. 512 while:
(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;
(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or
(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.
A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L. 1987, c. 101 (2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.
It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.
(4) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S. 39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L. 1981, c. 512, the defendant’s license to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life, which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person.
c. For good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.
d. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4.
As used in this section, “auto or vessel” means all means of conveyance propelled otherwise than by muscular power.
e. Any person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this title.
Related: Vehicular Homicide / Vehicular Manslaughter Charges Explained
The act of unlawfully killing another human being unintentionally.
Most unintentional killings are not murder but involuntary manslaughter. The absence of the element of intent is the key distinguishing factor between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. In most states involuntary manslaughter results from an improper use of reasonable care or skill while performing a legal act, or while committing an act that is unlawful but not felonious.
Many states do not define involuntary manslaughter, or define it vaguely in common-law terms. Some jurisdictions describe the amount of Negligence necessary to constitute manslaughter with terms such as criminal negligence, gross negligence, and culpable negligence. The only certainty that can be attached to these terms is that they require more than the ordinary negligence standard in a civil case. With this approach the state does not have to prove that the defendant was aware of the risk.
Other jurisdictions apply more subjective tests, such as "reckless" or "wanton," to describe the amount of negligence needed to constitute involuntary manslaughter. In this approach the defendant must have personally appreciated a risk and then chosen to take it anyway.
There are two types of involuntary manslaughter statutes: criminally negligent manslaughter and unlawful act manslaughter. Criminally negligent manslaughter occurs when death results from a high degree of negligence or recklessness. Modern criminal codes generally require a consciousness of risk and under some codes the absence of this element makes the offense a less serious Homicide.
An omission to act or a failure to perform a duty constitutes criminally negligent manslaughter. The existence of the duty is essential. Since the law does not recognize that an ordinary person has a duty to aid or rescue another in distress, a death resulting from an ordinary person's failure to act is not manslaughter. On the other hand, an omission by someone who has a duty, such as a failure to attempt to save a drowning person by a lifeguard, might constitute involuntary manslaughter.
In many jurisdictions death that results from the operation of a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner is punishable as a separate offense. Usually it is considered a less severe offense than involuntary manslaughter. These jurisdictions usually call the offense reckless homicide, negligent homicide, or vehicular homicide. One reason for this lesser offense is the reluctance of juries to convict automobile drivers of manslaughter.
Unlawful act manslaughter occurs when someone causes a death while committing or attempting to commit an unlawful act, usually a misdemeanor. Some states distinguish between conduct that is malum in se (bad in itself) and conduct that is malum prohibitum (bad because it is prohibited by law). Conduct that is malum in se is based on common-law definitions of crime; for example, an Assault and Battery could be classified as malum in se. Acts that are made illegal by legislation—for example, reckless driving—are malum prohibitum. In states that use this distinction, an act must be malum in se to constitute manslaughter. If an act is malum prohibitum, it is not manslaughter unless the person who committed it could have foreseen that death would be a direct result of the act.
In other states this distinction is not made. If death results from an unlawful act, the person who committed the act may be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter even if the act was malum prohibitum. Courts will uphold unlawful act manslaughter where the statute was intende
The failure to use reasonable care to avoid consequences that threaten or harm the safety of the public and that are the foreseeable outcome of acting in a particular manner.
Criminal negligence is a statutory offense that arises primarily in situations involving the death of an innocent party as a result of the operation of a motor vehicle by a person who is under the influence of Drugs and Narcotics or alcohol. Most statutes define such conduct as criminally negligent Homicide. Unlike the tort of Negligence, in which the party who acted wrongfully is liable for damages to the injured party, a person who is convicted of criminal negligence is subject to a fine, imprisonment, or both, because of the status of the conduct as a crime.
An indifference to, and a blatant violation of, a legal duty with respect to the rights of others.
Gross negligence is a conscious and voluntary disregard of the need to use reasonable care, which is likely to cause foreseeable grave injury or harm to persons, property, or both. It is conduct that is extreme when compared with ordinary Negligence, which is a mere failure to exercise reasonable care. Ordinary negligence and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while both differ from willful and wanton conduct, which is conduct that is reasonably considered to cause injury. This distinction is important, since contributory negligence—a lack of care by the plaintiff that combines with the defendant's conduct to cause the plaintiff's injury and completely bar his or her action—is not a defense to willful and wanton conduct but is a defense to gross negligence. In addition, a finding of willful and wanton misconduct usually supports a recovery of Punitive Damages, whereas gross negligence does not.
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