Does Driver’s License Violate The Constitution? And The License Bureau Rules?

 Does Driver’s License Violate The Constitution? And The License Bureau Rules?

According to the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), a commercial motor vehicle is defined as a vehicle used by individuals with a specific license to generate income. A license is typically required to obtain employment or run a business, as seen with professionals such as doctors, nurses, teachers, and others who need licensure to practice. Similarly, certain businesses, such as liquor stores or bars, require licenses to sell alcohol and generate revenue. In New Jersey, all professional and business licenses are issued by the state’s licensing bureau and recorded with the Secretary of State.

This raises a question: when someone obtains a driver’s license, are they expected to use it for work, employment, or generating income under commercial law? For example, individuals with a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) use roadways and highways to earn income, such as by operating trucks or buses. In contrast, many people use their personal vehicles for non-commercial purposes, such as traveling for enjoyment, grocery shopping, visiting family or friends, attending church, performing charitable duties, visiting a cemetery for therapeutic reasons, going to amusement parks, dining out, or watching a movie. These activities do not involve generating income.

If personal vehicles are used for non-commercial purposes, why are individuals required to have a driver’s license, insurance, and vehicle registration to travel on public roads? Roads, which some view as a public resource, should arguably be accessible for free travel without government agencies or corporations restricting personal freedom and liberty. When a police officer, often referred to as a policy officer, stops a driver, they should be required to prove that the individual was using their vehicle for commercial purposes, such as generating income. According to the definitions in the MVC, DMV, and FMCSR, “driving” and “operating a motor vehicle” typically refer to commercial activities tied to business or profit.

For instance, if someone uses their personal vehicle for passive income through services like Lyft, Uber, or DoorDash, they are arguably “driving” for commercial purposes rather than “traveling” for personal use. The terms “driving” and “traveling” carry different connotations. “Driving” often implies commercial activity, while “traveling” suggests personal, non-commercial movement. However, government agencies like the MVC, DMV, and FMCSR, as well as police officers, emphasize road safety, citing reckless driving as a threat to public lives. Yet, there are concerns about accountability. Why do some police officers, public transportation drivers, wealthy individuals, or celebrities appear to face fewer consequences for reckless driving? If safety is the primary concern behind traffic citations, why does it sometimes seem that citations are more about generating revenue through fines, tied to the Federal Reserve Note (currency), rather than ensuring public safety?

In summary, the requirement for licenses, insurance, and registration may feel like an infringement on personal freedom when individuals use their vehicles for non-commercial travel. Courts, police officers, judges, and prosecutors should consider whether a private citizen is operating under a commercial contract, as defined by relevant codes, before issuing citations or penalties. The distinction between “driving” for profit and “traveling” for personal use deserves greater scrutiny, especially when safety appears secondary to revenue generation.

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POLICE POWER

The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be paid for certain occupations. The power used in the instant

case cannot, however, be the power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a Right would be open to Constitutional objection. (See "taxing power," infra.)

Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions:

1. Is there threatened danger?

2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

3. Is this regulation reasonable?" People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715; Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power."

When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very important issues emerge.

First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using his automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life and business?

The answer is No! There is nothing inherently dangerous in the use of an automobile when it is carefully managed. Their guidance, speed, and noise are subject to a quick and easy control, under a competent and considerate manager, it is as harmless on the road as a

horse and buggy.

It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which threatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to respond quickly to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the least dangerous conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December, 1905.)

"The automobile is not inherently dangerous." Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876; Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE 532.

Page 11 of 21To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary course of life and business, because one might, in the future, become dangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.)

Next, does the regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

This question has already been addressed and answered in this brief, and need not be reinforced other than to remind this Court that this Citizen does have the Right to travel upon the public highway by automobile in the ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore be concluded that this regulation does involve a Constitutional Right.

The third question is the most important in this case. "Is this regulation reasonable?"

The answer is No! It will be shown later in "Regulation," infra., that this licensing statute is oppressive and could be effectively administered by less oppressive means.

Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police power, in accordance with the general principle that the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is established beyond question that every state power, including the police power, is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment (and others) and by the inhibitions there imposed.

Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulations must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates to limit the field of the police power to the extent

of preventing the enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the Amendment protects. (See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.)

"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority." Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887.

"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution." [emphasis added] Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613; Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60.

"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions."Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60.

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language." Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882.

As it applies in the instant case, the language of the Fifth Amendment is clear:

No person shall be...deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process of law.

Page 12 of 21As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established an absolute Right to travel.

In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to all entities, natural and artificial persons alike, has deprived this free and natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due process of law.

Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions:

"1. Is there threatened danger?

2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

3. Is this regulation reasonable?" People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715; Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power."

When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very important issues emerge.

When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very important issues are clarified.

First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using his automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life and business? The answer is No!

There is nothing inherently dangerous in the use of an automobile when it is carefully managed. Their guidance, speed, and noise are subject to a quick and easy control, under a competent and considerate manager, it is as harmless on the road as a

horse and buggy.

It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which threatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to respond quickly to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the least dangerous conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December, 1905.)

"The automobile is not inherently dangerous." Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876; Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE 532.

Page 11 of 21To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary course of life and business, because one might, in the future, become dangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.)

CONVERSION OF A RIGHT TO A CRIME

As previously demonstrated, the Citizen has the Right to travel and to transport his property upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business. However, if one exercises this Right to travel (without first giving up the Right and converting that Right into

a privilege) the Citizen is by statute, guilty of a crime. This amounts to converting the exercise of a Constitutional Right into a crime.

Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and Snerer vs. Cullen quotes from p.5, and, "The state cannot diminish Rights of the people." Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516.

and...

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda, supra.

Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under the limitations of the constitution was to protect the rights of the people from intrusion, particularly by the forces of government.

So we can see that any attempt by the legislature to make the act of using the public highways as a matter of Right into a crime, is void upon its face.

Any person who claims his Right to travel upon the highways, and so exercises that Right, cannot be tried for a crime of doing so. And yet, this Freeman stands before this court today to answer charges for the "crime" of exercising his Right to Liberty.

As we have already shown, the term "drive" can only apply to those who are employed in the business of transportation for hire. It has been shown that freedom includes the Citnzen's Right to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business without license or regulation by the police powers of the state.

CONCLUSION

It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and not the mere form.

"The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They

are at liberty -- indeed they are under a solemn duty -- to look at the substance of things,

whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purported to have been enacted to protect...the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects or is a palpable invasion of Rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661.

Page 18 of 21and..."It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616.

The courts are "duty bound" to recognize and stop the "stealthy encroachments" which have been made upon the Citizen's Right to travel and to use the roads to transport his property in the "ordinary course of life and business." (Hadfield, supra.)

Further, the court must recognize that the Right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a Citizen cannot be deprived without specific cause and without the "due process of law" guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. (Kent, supra.)

The history of this "invasion" of the Citizen's Right to use the public highways shows clearly that the legislature simply found a heretofore untapped source of revenue, got greedy, and attempted to enforce a statute in an unconstitutional manner upon those free and natural individuals who have a Right to travel upon the highways. This was not attempted in an outright action, but in a slow, meticulous, calculated encroachment upon the Citizen's Right to travel.

This position must be accepted unless the prosecutor can show his authority for the position that the "use of the road in the ordinary course of life and business" is a privilege.

To rule in any other manner, without clear authority for an adverse ruling, will infringe upon fundamental and basic concepts of Constitutional law. This position, that a Right cannot be regulated under any guise, must be accepted without concern for the monetary loss of the state.

"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the public." Slote vs. Examination, 112 ALR 660.

and… "Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of Constitutional guarantee." Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018; 16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect.81. and..."Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them." Watson vs. Memphis,375 US 526.

Page 19 of 21Therefore, the Court's decision in the instant case must be made without the issue of cost to the state being taken into consideration, as that issue is irrelevant. The state cannot lose

money that it never had a right to demand from the "Sovereign People."

Finally, we come to the issue of "public policy." It could be argued that the "licensing scheme" of all persons is a matter of "public policy." However, if this argument is used, it too must fail, as:

"No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution." 16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect.70.

So even "public policy" cannot abrogate this Citizen's Right to travel and to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business.

The courts operate on silent judicial notice of presumption all the time. It is time for this to end.

Generally, when you appear the Police Officer is not there because he has been instructed to stay home that day. You simply move for a dismissal for lack of prosecution, as the Prosecutor cannot

testify to facts, which he has no first hand knowledge of. Be especially careful of the judge’s conduct, he is required by his Oath of Office to be an impartial trier of fact, not the assistant prosecutor.

When I specially visit your court on a forced response on (Date of Hearing) to a Bill of Pains and Penalties issued by the Anthony Maza employed by the police Anthony Maza, employed by the corporate

New Jersey, I move this court and you, Judge Mark , to take judicial notice that my special visitation was forced, that my visitation is special, and not general, since this notice is my timely and specific objection to the presumptions upon which a false conclusion of law has been made administratively with regard to my status before this court.

The plaintiff in this case is an administrative officer representing the corporate and de facto New Jersey, which has legislative power to compel performance upon the letter of its statutes upon all persons subject to its jurisdiction. The only due process that its legislative courts recognize is the right to be heard on the facts of the case.

This court must take judicial Notice that Glen Ridge Municipal Court an un-enfranchised Individual has made a contrary conclusion of law to that of plaintiff. Naomi Johnson claims his guaranteed, fundamental and unalienable rights stemming from both the National and State constitutions to full due process of law in all criminal actions against him, means he is subject only to judicial power, not legislative power. Said, judicial power when exercised over him requires a corpus delicti or a damaged party who has sworn out a verified complaint against him. This is lacking in the criminal complaint against (Your Name) brought on by plaintiff.

So, the unlawfully charged Naomi Johnson declares that his enfranchised status as a preamble

American Citizen of the guaranteed "Republican form" of government known as The United States of America and inhabitant of New Jersey, that without a corpus delicti, no court judicial or legislative

tribunal has a criminal jurisdiction over his person or property.

“Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the public.” Slote vs. Examination, 112 ALR 660.

and...

“Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of Constitutional guarantee.” Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018; 16 Am. Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 81.

and...

“Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them.” Watson vs.

Memphis, 375 U.S. 526.

“Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them.” Watson vs.

Memphis, 375 U.S. 526.

Within the past couple decades, they moved it into "discovery", which is after arraignment, so the ability of one to challenge the jurisdiction and venue of the court was lost.

This is because entering a plea ACCEPTS the jurisdiction. In this way, only subject matter jurisdiction was challenge-able. If they say this is a matter at law, my defense against this jurisdiction is whether there is a live damaged party. I do not ask if this is an equity jurisdiction

because equity is not a criminal type of action.

If they say this is a matter in hustings (which is the true nature of action of all administrative law), my defense against this jurisdiction is that I am not an artificial person (unless I am a federal citizen - but that is quite another matter entirely), unless they can show from the records

in the Secretary of State's office that I have charted as such.

If they say this is an admiralty matter, my defense against this jurisdiction is whether the offense was committed on federal territory, over which the state has retained concurrent jurisdiction (although I still have-not found how the state exercises an admiralty jurisdiction in

light of 28 USC §1333).

If they say this is a military matter, my defense against this jurisdiction is that:

1) I am not a member of their military (I am, however, a member of the Militia of one of the several states - but they do not operate as such anymore),

2) the nation is not under martial law (or is it?).

However, they are not going to admit the nature of the action, as this will admit their want of jurisdiction on the record for all to see, so THEY move to dismiss the charges.

I simply do not understand the Nature and Cause of Action or the Accusation with regard to the elements of personal jurisdiction, venue, and the nature of the action until the prosecution properly alleges them. I am therefore unable to enter a plea to the charge, until I have had an opportunity to raise a meaningful defense against these elements.

I cannot rebut an unstated presumption.

Within the past couple decades, they moved it into "discovery", which is after arraignment, so the ability of one to challenge the jurisdiction and venue of the court was lost.

This is because entering a plea ACCEPTS the jurisdiction. In this way, only subject matter jurisdiction was challenge-able. If they say this is a matter at law, my defense against this jurisdiction is whether there is a live damaged Party. I do not ask if this is an equity jurisdiction because equity is not a criminal type of action.

The State of New Jersey legislature can not vest the court with authority that has not been delegated to it by the people via the constitution of the state. They cannot create a new nature of action out of thin air.

Later on, when the constitutions of the several States were amended to recognize and administrate corporations, a separate court was established, and the action was in the nature of administrative.

Live people could not be brought into administrative courts, as the only matter at issue was a breach of corporate charter by an artificial person. Somewhere along the line, the announcement in the Complaint of the nature of the action was lost.

The attorneys all got together and decided that it would be much "simpler" (for them) if there were only one form of action. So today, there is no disclosure of the nature of the action, unless one demands to know the nature and cause of the accusation by using a demand for a bill of particulars.

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