MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
TRAVEL
I. INTRODUCTION
This memorandum is submitted in support of the position that the Right to Travel is a fundamental, constitutionally protected liberty that cannot be lawfully abridged by statutory licensing schemes when exercised privately and non-commercially. This right, firmly rooted in common law, constitutional text, and judicial precedent, is distinct from the state-regulated activity of “driving” or “operating a motor vehicle” in commerce. the Basic Obligation of Public Service, as articulated by Thomas Jefferson: “When a man assumes a public trust, he should consider himself as public property.” This principle, reflected in the ethical standards of Executive Order 12674 (Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees), underscores that public service is a public trust, requiring officials to uphold constitutional rights with integrity. Defendants’ failure to do so warrants declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and related laws.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Statement of Facts provides a concise and neutral summary of the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation of Plaintiff Naomi Johnson's fundamental right to travel, based on the factual allegations provided. These events relate to a motion asserting that the actions of the Glen Ridge Police Department, E.C.R.B. Towing & Recovery, and the Glen Ridge Municipal Court unlawfully restricted her right to travel.
Unlawful Stop and Seizure (February 24, 2025): On February 24, 2025, at approximately 3:00 PM in Glen Ridge, NJ, Naomi Johnson, a disabled woman, was stopped by Sergeant Anthony D. Mazza of the Glen Ridge Police Department while traveling privately in her personal vehicle, which displayed a handicap license plate. Sgt. Mazza alleged she failed to stop at a stop sign, a claim Ms. Johnson disputed, asserting she stopped briefly and proceeded safely. When questioned, Sgt. Mazza cited "probable cause" but provided no evidence of criminal activity. Ms. Johnson provided her license, registration, and insurance under duress after Sgt. Mazza’s passive-aggressive response. He then ordered her vehicle towed for being "unregistered," despite her claim of a processed online registration payment in September 2024, without her consent or a judicial warrant. No accommodations were provided for her disability, forcing her to walk home in cold temperatures, exacerbating her chronic pain and mobility issues.
Towing and Retrieval Issues (February 26–March 3, 2025): Ms. Johnson attempted to retrieve her vehicle from E.C.R.B. Towing & Recovery on February 26, February 27, and March 1, 2025, but the facility was closed, despite advertising 24-hour service, violating New Jersey consumer protection laws requiring reasonable access for vehicle retrieval. On March 1, 2025, Ms. Johnson visited the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) to verify her registration, where she was advised to pay again in person due to a possible system error. On March 3, 2025, she presented proof of registration to the Glen Ridge Police Department and retrieved her vehicle, incurring a $575.69 fee from E.C.R.B. Towing, including charges for storage ($280), hook ($95), yard ($85), towing notification ($75), credit card use ($22.14), and tax. The towing company also initiated an abandoned title process prematurely, despite her attempts to recover the vehicle, which she contested as unlawful.
Legal Correspondence and Municipal Court Actions: On [date of towing], Ms. Naomi Johnson’s vehicle was towed by E.C.R.B. Towing in violation of Glen Ridge Borough Ordinance Chapter 10-05, which permits towing only for abandoned, disabled, illegally parked, crashed, stolen, or criminally involved vehicles. Her vehicle did not meet these criteria, nor did the towing comply with the New Jersey Predatory Towing Prevention Act (N.J.S.A. 56:13-7 et seq.). Ms. Johnson sent certified notices to the Glen Ridge Police Department, Municipal Court, E.C.R.B. Towing, and municipal officials, asserting these violations.
On February 26, 2025, Ms. Johnson filed a Writ of Replevin to recover her vehicle, a Motion to Dismiss any related tickets, and a Notice to Show Cause, but received no responses. The Glen Ridge Municipal Court issued a bench warrant for her alleged failure to appear, despite no evidence of proper service. In a July 25, 2025 letter, Judge Mark Clemente admitted Ms. Johnson was not required to appear but suggested she pay the tickets online to resolve the matter, which she viewed as coercive. On August 1, 2025, Ms. Johnson responded, challenging the court’s jurisdiction, filing an OPRA request, a Motion to Quash the Warrant, and a Motion to Dismiss for lack of proper service. These actions violated Ms. Johnson’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and New Jersey Constitution, as she was not properly notified of the court date or warrant. The court’s non-responsiveness and coercive tactics also raise civil rights concerns. Ms. Johnson seeks to vacate the warrant, dismiss the tickets, and hold the responsible parties accountable for unlawful towing and procedural violations.
ADA Violations and Impact: Ms. Johnson, medically disabled with documented chronic pain and mobility impairments, received no accommodations during the stop, towing, or vehicle retrieval process, violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The forced walk home caused severe physical and emotional distress, including heightened anxiety, depression, PTSD, and arthritis flare-ups, requiring medical treatment. The Municipal Court ignored her ADA accommodation requests, including for a remote hearing.
Ongoing Harm: Ms. Johnson’s vehicle had writing placed on the windshield by the towing company, which she could not remove due to disability-related tremors. She sent multiple certified letters to oversight agencies, including the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office and the Federal Trade Commission, with minimal response. Her Open Public Records Act (OPRA) requests for records were denied. As of September 25, 2025, the bench warrant remains active, causing ongoing fear of arrest and financial, physical, and emotional harm.
These facts demonstrate that Ms. Johnson was engaged in non-commercial, private travel with no harm or injury to person or property, yet faced an unlawful stop, vehicle seizure, and subsequent actions that allegedly violated her fundamental right to travel, due process, and ADA protections.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the State may lawfully require a private citizen engaged in noncommercial travel to obtain a driver’s license.
2. Whether the statutory term “driving” applies to the private conveyance of persons or property absent commercial activity.
3. Whether compelled licensing constitutes a contract of adhesion, lacking voluntary informed consent, thereby infringing constitutional rights.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Courts must strictly scrutinize any statute that restricts a fundamental right. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). The burden rests on the State to demonstrate that such restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and that no less restrictive means exist.
V. ARGUMENT
A. The Right to Travel is a Fundamental Constitutional Liberty
1.Constitutional Provisions
o Article IV, § 2, Cl. 1: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”
o Fifth & Fourteenth Amendments: Protect liberty from deprivation without due process of law.
O Ninth Amendment: Retains rights not expressly enumerated, including the natural right of locomotion.
Distinction Between “Travel” and “Driving”
Courts have distinguished between traveling—the constitutional right of movement—and driving—a commercial activity subject to regulation. Private travel for personal and non-commercial purposes is not within the scope of motor carrier regulations or commercial statutes.
In Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 169 N.E. 22 (Ill. 1929), the court held:
“The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.”
Further, in Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579 (Va. 1930), the court stated:
“The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, automobile, or otherwise, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
The Plaintiff’s conveyance was used solely for private travel, not in commerce or for hire, and therefore falls outside the jurisdiction of statutes that regulate motor vehicles engaged in trade or business.
C. The State May Not Convert a Right Into a Privilege and Require a License or Fee
It is well established that the State may not convert a right into a privilege and then punish the exercise of that right.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943): “No state may convert a right into a privilege and issue a license and a fee for it.”
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969): “If the State does convert a liberty into a privilege, the citizen may engage in the right with impunity.”
Thus, requiring a driver’s license or vehicle registration for private, non-commercial travel imposes an unconstitutional condition upon the free exercise of a fundamental right.
D. Unlawful Seizure and Deprivation of Property Without Due Process
The towing and impoundment of Plaintiff’s private conveyance constituted an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Under Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court held that no property may be taken without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The seizure of Plaintiff’s conveyance occurred without a warrant, without probable cause, and without due process, rendering it constitutionally void.
E. Equal Protection and ADA Considerations
The Plaintiff is a medically disabled woman, protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Law enforcement officials had a statutory and constitutional duty to make reasonable accommodations during all encounters. The failure to do so, combined with the retaliatory towing of Plaintiff’s conveyance, constitutes discrimination under Title II of the ADA and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Judicial Recognition
o Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) — “The right to travel is part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law.”
o Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) — The right to travel “occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”
o Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 629 — Restrictions on travel must promote a compelling governmental interest.
O United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–58 (1966) — Freedom to travel throughout the United States is a constitutional right.
O Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930) — The right to travel upon public highways is not a mere privilege, but a common right under liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
B. Distinguishing “Travel” from Regulated “Driving”
At common law, travel referred to the act of moving from place to place in the ordinary course of life, whether on foot or by conveyance, without engaging in commerce. Statutes defining “driving” or “operating a motor vehicle” often limit the term to those engaged in transportation for hire.
When a private citizen accepts a driver’s license, courts presume consent to the state’s jurisdiction over the licensed activity — effectively transforming private travel into a regulated commercial activity. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that a state may regulate “driving” as an activity but acknowledging the broader constitutional right to travel).
C. The Contractual Nature of Licensing Schemes
According to the principles outlined in Mercier’s Invisible Contracts, a driver’s license constitutes an adhesion contract. The licensee applies voluntarily, but without full disclosure of the legal consequences, including:
1. Submission to state regulatory jurisdiction.
2. Waiver of certain common-law travel rights.
3. Agreement to abide by traffic codes not applicable to unlicensed private travelers.
Private contracts may lawfully supersede constitutional protections in matters governed by the contract (Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498 (1900)), but only when consent is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The lack of informed consent in licensing procedures calls into question the legitimacy of the state’s regulatory reach over private travel.
D. Compelled Licensing Fails Strict Scrutiny for Noncommercial Travel
The state’s interest in public safety can be served through narrowly tailored means that do not compel licensing of all private travelers. The blanket requirement for a driver’s license, without
distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial use, is overly broad and infringes upon the fundamental right to travel.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Constitution, common law, and controlling judicial precedent recognize and protect the Right to Travel as a fundamental liberty. The statutory licensing of “drivers” applies properly to those engaged in commerce on the highways, but not to private citizens engaged in noncommercial travel. Compelling a license in the latter case constitutes an unconstitutional condition and an unenforceable contract of adhesion.
The Court should recognize the distinction between travel and commercial driving, find that Plaintiff’s activities fall within the former category, and declare the enforcement of licensing requirements against Plaintiff unconstitutional as applied.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the fundamental right to travel is constitutionally protected and cannot be abridged through administrative regulations, commercial statutes, or arbitrary police enforcement actions. Any attempt to criminalize or penalize the free exercise of this right—such as ticketing, towing, or arrest—constitutes a violation of substantive due process, equal protection, and civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that this Court:
Recognize and affirm Plaintiff’s inherent and fundamental right to travel;
Declare the actions of the Glen Ridge Police Department and Municipal Court unconstitutional;
Order the immediate removal of all unlawful fines, warrants, and records related to the February 24, 2025 incident; and
Grant any further relief that this Court deems just and proper in the interest of law and equity.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
1. Declare that the right to travel is a fundamental constitutional liberty.
2. Enjoin the State from enforcing driver’s license requirements against Plaintiff for noncommercial travel.
3. Award any other relief deemed just and proper.
VIII. EXHIBITS
Exhibit A – Statutory Definitions
1. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Code Title 39 N.J.S.A. 39:1-1– Definition of “Driver”
Example from New Jersey Vehicle Code 39:1-1, a motor vehicle is defined as:
"All vehicles propelled other than by muscular power, except such vehicles as run only upon rails or tracks or motorized bicycles".
2. Example from 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6): “Motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways.
3. Commercial Purpose – 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(10):
“Used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge, or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business or other undertaking intended for profit.
Exhibit B – Black’s Law Dictionary Excerpts
1. Travel (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.):
“Travel: The act of passing from place to place; a journey; a trip; the general course of going from one place to another for business or pleasure. ‘Travel’ and ‘traveler’ are usually construed in their broad and general sense. One who
uses a conveyance in going from place to place, irrespective of the means of conveyance, is a traveler.”
2. Driver (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.):
“Driver: One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle.”
Exhibit C – Historical Case Law Supporting Travel as a Right
1. Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930):
“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
2. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867):
“The right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and is secured by the Constitution to all free inhabitants.”
3. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958):
“The right to travel is part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”
4. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999):
“The right to travel protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) — The right to travel “occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”
Thus, the right to move about freely, without unlawful restraint, is a natural liberty inherent to every individual.
Exhibit D – Constitutional Provisions
1. Article IV, § 2, Cl. 1 – Privileges and Immunities Clause.
2. First Amendment – Freedom of assembly (implies freedom of movement).
3. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments – Due process protections for liberty.
4. Ninth Amendment – Reservation of unenumerated rights to the people.
Exhibit E – Federal Recognition of Commercial Jurisdiction
1. 27 C.F.R. § 72.11 – Definition of “Commercial Crimes” includes transportation and related offenses when tied to commerce.
2. Federal statutes consistently define regulatory jurisdiction over vehicles in relation to commercial purposes.
Respectfully submitted,
Naomi Johnson
Private Woman / Beneficial Owner
Date:
Dated this day of Month, year.
Attorney Name
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