Naomi Johnson Formal Rebuttal to Glen Ridge Police Lt. Timothy Faranda Internal Affairs Report – Incident 25-0xxxx Against Sgt. Anthony Mazza.pdf

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Date of Record Creation: August 30, 2025

Author / Beneficial Owner: Naomi Johnson, We The People / Private Woman

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Naomi Johnson Formal Rebuttal to Glen Ridge Police Lt. Timothy Faranda Internal Affairs Report – Incident 25-0xxxx Against Sgt. Anthony Mazza.pdf


Naomi Johnson

Private Woman / Beneficial Owner

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Date: August 28, 2025

To: Lt . Timothy Faranda

Glen Ridge Police Department

Internal Affairs Division

825 Bloomfield Avenue

Glen Ridge, NJ 07028

Re: Formal Rebuttal to Internal Affairs Report – Incident 25-0xxxx

Dear Lt . Timothy Faranda, Internal Affairs Division,

My formal rebuttal to the Glen Ridge Police Department Internal Affairs (IA) Report dated July 7, 2025, regarding Incident 25-0xxxx. The The Internal Affairs Complaint report concludes that Sgt. Anthony Mazza “acted within his duty” and followed department policies and New Jersey Title 39 statutes. This conclusion fails to address multiple legal, constitutional, and civil rights obligations that Sgt. Mazza is sworn to uphold, including the U.S. Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), natural law, and principles of public rights and due process.

Every police officer swears an oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution, which supersedes under the internal policies and statutory law Supremacy Clause (U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2). Compliance with department policy rules or statutory law, such as New Jersey Title 39, does not excuse violations of constitutional rights (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)). Statutory and administrative regulations are legislative or procedural in nature, not constitutional law. Constitutional obligations are a separate and higher standard, and Internal Affairs’ focus on policy compliance does not negate the officer’s duty to uphold constitutional protections.

Title 39 of the New Jersey statutes is administrative in nature, not criminal law. An officer may not import criminal law concepts to justify seizing a person or property in response to a regulatory infraction. Under the Constitution, police may only demand identification or detain an individual where there is a legitimate, constitutionally grounded basis, such as reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Passing a stop sign or operating an unregistered private conveyance are administrative infractions subject, at most, to civil penalty. They do not constitute crimes, nor do they create reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct or probable cause sufficient to justify a custodial seizure of person or property. Thus, escalating such matters into an arrest, vehicle seizure, or bench warrant proceeding exceeds lawful authority and violates constitutional protections.

Even if one accepts, arguendo, that Sergeant Mazza had grounds under Title 39 to initiate a traffic stop based on an the traffic ticket issued for failure to stop at a stop sign, such authority was strictly limited to issuing a summons for the alleged infraction. Title 39 does not confer criminal jurisdiction, nor does it authorize escalation into custodial detention or seizure of property absent independent, constitutionally valid cause. The Internal Affairs finding that “probable cause” under Title 39 justified seizure of my person and vehicle improperly conflates an administrative infraction with a criminal offense.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that administrative or regulatory stops do not automatically authorize further intrusion without independent cause. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (stopping a vehicle to check licenses or registration requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (mere presence or minor regulatory violation does not justify detention absent reasonable suspicion).

I see that you overlooked these critical distinctions while conducting the Internal Affairs investigation into Sergeant Anthony Mazza.

The New Jersey Constitution, Article I, §2, explicitly states that government derives its power from the people, and that the people are the ultimate sovereign. Every individual possesses unalienable rights that cannot be lawfully violated by the state. The Internal Affairs Complaint report fails to consider or protect these unalienable rights, including the right to due process, equal protection, and freedom from arbitrary seizure.

The The Internal Affairs Complaint report completely disregards recognized human rights and civil liberties standards, including due process violations, the vehicle impoundment and associated actions occurred without proper legal justification or notice (U.S. Const. Amend. V & XIV; NJ Const. Art. I, §1, §10). ADA violations, I am a medically disabled person, and the report ignores whether accommodations were provided as required under 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. and NJLAD (New Jersey Law Against Discrimination). Equal protection and anti-discrimination, the report does not consider whether police actions were applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner. Public Rights Doctrine & Preliminary Power Doctrine, officers exercise authority only within constitutional and statutory limits, not merely internal policy. Unalienable Rights of Naomi Johnson, the IA report fails to acknowledge that, as a private woman and beneficial owner, I hold rights that the officer is sworn to protect under both state and federal law.

The report asserts that Sgt. Mazza “did not act outside his duty” and that he followed department policies. This mischaracterization is legally and doctrinally flawed. Duty under an oath is defined by constitutional, statutory, and common law obligations, not internal department rules. The report implies that following internal rules alone constitutes lawful exercise of police power, ignoring the constitutional and civil rights standard (Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). Preliminary Power Doctrine, officers must determine lawfulness before acting; failing to consider constitutional or ADA obligations exceeds or abuses police power. Commercial/statutory framing of police policy, for example towing fees, does not negate constitutional responsibilities (Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), interpreting commercial regulations under federal law).

The Internal Affairs Complaint report fails to consider or address due process violations, the officer’s actions in seizing and impounding the vehicle without proper notice or legal justification were not reviewed for constitutional compliance. No legal notice or opportunity to contest seizure prior to impoundment. No, acknowledgment that my groceries were in my personal conveyance for seven days while it was in the impound. Once I retrieved my car, I had to throw away a massive amount of food because it spoiled. ADA violations, the report ignores the fact that I documented medical disability and does not evaluate whether my rights under the ADA were respected during the stop and seizure. Abuse of authority, by framing the officer’s actions as simply “policy-compliant,” the report implies that the officer acted within the scope of his duty and did not exercise police power, which overlooks the constitutional requirement that police powers must be exercised lawfully and not in violation of civil rights. Misuse of statutory authority without constitutional compliance.

Failure to uphold constitutional oath, the report does not examine whether Sgt. Mazza’s actions were consistent with his sworn duty to uphold the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions, which take precedence over statutory and administrative rules. Natural law and common law obligations, right to property and protection from arbitrary seizure. Popular sovereignty & Public Rights Doctrine, the state derives power from the people; the officer’s actions must respect the sovereignty and unalienable rights of the citizen. Doctrine of supremacy & precedence of Constitution over statutes and policy, The Internal Affairs Complaint’s reliance on department policy is subordinate to constitutional duties. Commercial and statutory framing of internal policy, treating procedural rules as compliance with law misapplies the legal standard of constitutional supremacy.

The IA report does not hold Sgt. Mazza accountable for actions that violated my constitutional, statutory, and civil rights. By focusing solely on department policy and Title 39 compliance, the report ignores the officer’s higher duty under the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions, the ADA, and unalienable rights guaranteed to every individual. The Internal Affairs Complaint report cannot be relied upon as a lawful determination of compliance with constitutional obligations or civil rights protections. It mischaracterizes the officer’s conduct as lawful and proper, when in fact it ignores the higher constitutional and civil rights obligations that govern all police actions, including due process, disability accommodations, and lawful use of police power.

I formally rebut the The Internal Affairs Complaint conclusion and preserve all rights to pursue legal action for constitutional and civil rights violations, including claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, ADA enforcement, and common law protections.

References & Authority (Non-Exhaustive)

U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2 (Supremacy Clause)

U.S. Constitution, Amendments V & XIV (Due Process & Equal Protection)

New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, §§1, 2, 10 (People as Sovereign; Unalienable Rights)

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)

Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 7, 9, 21)

American Jurisprudence, Vol. 55, Police §102

Public Law 101-336, ADA

Commercial statutes and principles: 49 U.S.C., 47 CFR, UCC 1-308/1-201

Natural law and common law maxims: ubi jus ibi remedium, lex naturalis

Doctrinal references: Public Rights Doctrine, Preliminary Power Doctrine

Respectfully submitted,

Naomi Johnson

Private Woman / Beneficial Owner

https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/naomi-johnson-formal-rebuttal-to-glen-ridge-police-lt-timothy-faranda-internal-affairs-report-incident-25-0xxxx-against-sgt-anthony-mazza-pdf/282799296


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doctrine

A doctrine is a single important rule, a set of rules, a theory, or a principle that is widely followed in a field of law. It is formed via the continuous application of legal precedents. Calling something a doctrine usually means at least one of two things: that it is very important to a field of law, or that it provides a comprehensive way to resolve a certain type of legal dispute.

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