PUBLIC RECORD NOTICE
The documents contained on this page, including but not limited to affidavits, rebuttals, tort claim notices, and related submissions concerning the Glen Ridge Police Department and public officers, are intended to serve as a public record.
These documents have been made publicly accessible in accordance with principles of:
Transparency and accountability in government operations;
Public Rights Doctrine and Popular Sovereignty, recognizing the people as the ultimate authority;
New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq., supporting access to governmental records;
U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552, supporting public disclosure of information concerning government conduct;
Purpose:
To preserve a legal and historical record of official actions, including investigations, internal affairs reports, and civil rights concerns;
To provide public access for review, transparency, and accountability;
To document the timeline and content of government actions for potential legal reference.
Usage:
The contents may be freely accessed, downloaded, and referenced for educational, journalistic, civic, or legal purposes.
Users must not modify the original documents.
Disclaimer:
Personal information unrelated to public officers or government action has been redacted where necessary to protect privacy.
This notice is not intended to replace any legal filings or proceedings; it supplements legal documentation by providing public access.
Date of Record Creation: August 30, 2025
Author / Beneficial Owner: Naomi Johnson, We The People / Private Woman
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Executive Summary – Notice of Constitutional and Procedural Violations
On February 24, 2025, Officer Anthony Mazza of the Glen Ridge Police Department pulled me over for allegedly failing to stop at a stop sign and for driving an unregistered vehicle, both administrative civil infractions under Title 39, not crimes. Officer Mazza towed my vehicle and forced me, a disabled woman, to walk home. The Police Internal Affairs, through Lt. Timothy Faranda, concluded that the officer “did nothing wrong” and merely followed procedure.
This conclusion ignores the constitutional and statutory framework governing police authority. Title 39 is civil and administrative; an officer cannot invoke criminal law doctrines such as probable cause to justify custodial seizure of a person or property. Demanding identification, towing my car, and issuing a bench warrant without lawful cause constitutes unlawful deprivation of liberty and property.
My vehicle contained personal groceries that remained in impound for seven days, all of which spoiled, resulting in financial loss and undue hardship. Forcing me to walk home while disabled, coupled with the loss of property, violated my rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections.
Police officers take an oath to uphold the New Jersey and United States Constitutions, not merely internal procedures. They are public servants accountable to the people, not rulers over them. The actions taken against me—including the towing, forced walk, and spoilage of property, constitute unlawful and unconstitutional conduct. Internal Affairs failed to address these violations and did not provide accountability.
This Notice documents the violations and demands immediate recognition, accountability, and corrective action to uphold the constitutional rights of private citizens.
One of the People of New Jersey Notice of Constitutional Violation
To Whom It May Concern:
The Police Internal Affairs has failed to address the unlawful actions of Officer Anthony Mazza, who pulled me over for an alleged failure to stop at a stop sign and for driving an unregistered vehicle. Officer Mazza subsequently towed my car and forced me, a disabled woman, to walk home. According to Lt. Timothy Faranda’s report, Officer Mazza did nothing wrong and merely followed procedure.
This determination is unacceptable. Police officers take an oath to uphold the New Jersey and United States Constitutions, not merely internal policies, rules, regulations, or procedures. Officers are required to enforce the law in a manner that respects the rights of private people, private women, private men, and private citizens, consistent with the unalienable rights guaranteed by both the New Jersey and United States Constitutions.
The police must recognize that they are public servants governed by the people, not rulers over the people. The actions taken against me, including the towing of my vehicle and forcing me to walk home while disabled, constitute a violation of my constitutional rights. The Internal Affairs report fails to address these unlawful actions and does not provide accountability for the officer’s misconduct.
This Notice serves to formally document the constitutional violations and to demand recognition, accountability, and corrective action in accordance with the protections guaranteed under state and federal law.
Here is the Criminal doctrine reference table formatted for your Naomi's case filings. It shows the doctrine, definition, source, and direct application to your February 24, 2025 stop and impound:
| Doctrine | Definition / Standard | Source / Case Law | Application to Naomi Johnson’s Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reasonable Suspicion | Police may stop and briefly detain someone if there are specific and articulable facts suggesting criminal activity. Lower standard than probable cause. | Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) | Traffic violations (stop sign, unregistered vehicle) are civil infractions, not crimes. Sergeant Mazza lacked proper reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. |
| Probable Cause | Facts and circumstances sufficient for a reasonable person to believe a crime has occurred, is occurring, or will occur. Required for arrests, searches, and seizures. | Fourth Amendment; Illinois v. Gates, 1983 | Driving a private car with minor infractions does not rise to probable cause. Seizing the vehicle and issuing a warrant exceeded authority. |
| Exclusionary Rule | Evidence obtained through unlawful stops, searches, or seizures is inadmissible in court. | Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) | The impound, tickets, and bench warrant are all “fruit of the poisonous tree” stemming from an unlawful stop. |
| Fruit of the Poisonous Tree | Derivative evidence or penalties from an unlawful action are inadmissible or void. | Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) | All consequences of the stop, including towing and bench warrant, are tainted and unlawful. |
| Plain View Doctrine | Officers may seize evidence in plain sight if lawfully present and item’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent. | Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) | No evidence in Ms. Johnson’s vehicle was visible in plain view; this doctrine does not justify seizure. |
| Automobile Exception | Vehicles may be searched without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is inside. | Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) | No probable cause existed; civil infractions do not justify warrantless search or seizure. |
| Community Caretaking Doctrine | Police may impound vehicles to protect public safety or for administrative purposes, not investigative purposes. | Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) | Vehicle was not abandoned, blocking traffic, or dangerous. Impound was punitive and exceeded community caretaking authority. |
| Due Process Doctrine | Individuals cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without proper procedures and notice. | Fifth & Fourteenth Amendments | Bench warrant, seizure of vehicle, and spoilage of groceries violated due process and constituted excessive intrusion. |
| ADA / Disability Rights | Disabled persons must receive reasonable accommodations; government cannot impose undue burdens. | Title II, Americans with Disabilities Act | Ms. Johnson is disabled; towing forced her to walk long distances and caused loss of essential groceries, violating her ADA rights. |
| Pretextual Stops | A stop may be lawful if based on any traffic violation, even if the officer has another motive. Controversial if used for discriminatory profiling. | Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) | Stop was minor; escalation to impound and warrant was disproportionate, punitive, and potentially discriminatory. |
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